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Abstract
In many European countries, due to population aging, the switch from
conventional unfunded public pension systems to notional systems character-
ized by individual accounts is in debate. In this article, we develop an OLG
model in which endogenous growth is based on an accumulation of knowledge
driven by the proportion of skilled workers and the time they have spent to
be trained. In such a framework, we show that conventional pension systems,
contrary to notional systems, can enhance economic growth by linking bene-
ts only to partial earnings history. Thus, considering economic growth, the
optimal adjustment to aging could consist in increasing the size of existing
retirement systems rather than switching to notional systems.
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1 Introduction
In 1950, life expectancy at birth in Western Europe was 68 years. Nowadays,
it is 80 years and should reach 85 years in 2050 (United Nations, 2009).
The downside of this trend is the serious threat that is hanging over the
nancing of our public retirement systems. Financed on a PAYG basis, i.e.
pension benets are paid through contributions of contemporary workers,
they must cope with the increasingly larger number of pensioners compared
to the number of contributors. With an unchanged average age of retirement,
the ratio of pensioners to workers (the dependency ratio) should reach in
France, for example, 70.1% in 2040, whereas it was 35.8% in 1990. Changes
are unavoidable. If we want to guarantee in the near future the current level
of benets within the same system, it will be necessary either to increase
the contribution rate or the length of contribution (by delaying the age of
retirement).
This nancing problem calls into question the role of PAYG retirement
systems in our societies. For instance, by evaluating the real pre-tax return
on non-nancial corporate capital at 9.3%1 and the growth rate over the same
period (1960 to 1995) at 2.6%, Feldstein (1995a, 1995b, 1996) unequivocally
advocates the privatisation of retirement systems and to opt for fully funded
systems. He assesses the potential present-value gain to nearly $20 trillion
for the United States. However, replacing conventional PAYG systems by
nancial -or funded- dened contribution (FDC) systems would certainly in-
volve prohibitive social and political costs of transition. One generation will
have to pay twice. Implementing such a reform in Western democracies ap-
1This return combines prots before all federal, state, and local taxes with the net
interest paid. The method of calculation is described in Feldstein, Poterba and Dicks-
Mireaux (1983).
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pears then di¢ cult. For that reason, in recent years a large focus has been
put on non-nancial -or notional- dened contribution (NDC) systems as
legislated in Sweden in 1994. As described by Palmer (2006), NDC systems
are PAYG systems which mimic FDC systems. Individual contributions are
noted on individual accounts. Accounts are credited with a rate of return
which reects demographic and productivity changes. Obviously, replacing
conventional PAYG systems by NDC systems does not adress the main con-
cern of Feldstein (1995a, 1995b, 1996) that is the low return associated with
PAYG nancing method. However, supporters of the latter claim that the
former, by linking pension benets only partially to contributions, distort
individual behaviors, inducing a reduced work e¤ort or an earlier retirement.
On this matter, they would defend actuarial fairness, versus progressivity, as
a desirable feature.
On the basis of their pension benet formulas, progressivity is one of the
features most associated with conventional retirement systems. It is espe-
cially true in Anglo-Saxon countries where pensions are weakly related to
earnings. However, going further into conventional systems reveals that pen-
sion benet formulas cannot account for the true progressivity of retirement
systems. Though the American system has one of the most progressive pen-
sion benet formula (see OECD, 2007), all empirical studies stressed its low
progressivity (Burkhauser and Walick, 1981; Garrett, 1995; Gustman and
Steinmeier, 2001; Coronado et al., 1999, 2000; Brown et al., 2006). The
pension benet formula denes a poor index of progressivity because it does
not take into account specicities related to gender, life expectancy or insti-
tutional features. First, the redistribution within the system is carried out
from men towards women. Second, redistribution within the system is to the
advantage of people who live longer and, as noted by Deaton and Paxton
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(1998, 1999), di¤erences in life expectancies are strongly related to social
inequality: high-income earners live longer than low-income earners. Third,
as argued by Lindbeck and Persson (2003) and Bozio and Piketty (2008), in-
stitutional features such as linking pensions to the best or last years tend to
favor those with steep age-earnings proles, i.e. again high-income earners.
When considering these elements, Gustman and Steinmeier (2001) show that
retirement system returns are almost identical whatever the household earn-
ings. In the same line, Coronado et al. (2000) and Brown et al. (2006) show
that the U.S. Social Security has no impact on the GINI index measuring in-
come inequality. As the American pension benet formula is one of the most
progressive, most retirement systems in the industrial world appear, in fact,
close to actuarial fairness2 (see Stahlberg, 1990, for the Swedish system). As
a consequence, we can not expect from NDC systems a signicant decrease
in the negative incentive e¤ects associated with conventional systems.
In many respects, introducing a NDC system largely involves moving
from a dened benet to a dened contribution system to guarantee the
stability of contributions in spite of aging populations. It may be pointed
out that this objective can be achieved similarly within the scope of more
conventional dened benet systems, as seen in the "point system" in France
or in Germany. In that case, the unit of pension rights is earnings points
(not euros) and can be adjusted according to demographic and productivity
changes as in a NDC system. As stressed by Börsch-Supan (2006), cleverly
designed conventional retirement systems can often do the same job as NDC
2Strictly speaking, a retirement system is said actuarially fair if its return is equal
to the interest rate (Lindbeck and Persson, 2003; Cigno, 2008). Considering that the
economic growth rate, which is the retirement system return, is lower than the interest
rate, retirement systems could be described more properly as quasi-actuarial fair as noted
by Lindbeck and Persson (2003).
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systems.
In this article, observing that most conventional retirement systems are
actuarially fair, we then compare the latter with NDC systems. In particular,
focusing on the age-earnings prole, we investigate the relation between pen-
sion benets and earnings history. Indeed, as pointed out by Lindbeck and
Persson (2003) and Bozio and Piketty (2008), the way pension benets are
calculated when considering heterogenous work histories and age-earnings
proles can have important consequences in terms of income redistribution,
even when comparing actuarially fair systems. From this perspective, this
article also relates to the literature studying the impact of retirement systems
on the investment in human capital and on economic growth. Theoretically,
if considering that economic growth is driven by physical capital accumula-
tion, by reducing private savings, PAYG retirement systems are harmful for
economic growth (Saint-Paul, 1992; Belan et al.3, 1998). However, empiri-
cal ndings from Sala-i-Martin (1996) and Zhang and Zhang (2004) tend to
support a positive impact of retirement systems on economic growth through
the human capital channel. In this line, Zhang (1995), Sala-i-Martin (1996),
Kemnitz and Wigger (2000), Le Garrec (2001) and Zhang and Zhang (2003)
have therefore shown that PAYG retirement systems could stimulate eco-
nomic growth by stimulating investment in education. Interestingly, these
results have been obtained in models with identical learning ability of individ-
uals. By contrast, when considering heterogenous learning ability, Docquier
and Paddison (2003) show that conventional retirement systems can not en-
hance economic growth even when economic growth is driven by investment
in education. To explain these conicting results, one can observe that in
3In that case, they show that the transition from PAYG to funded systems could be
Pareto-improving.
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Kemnitz and Wigger (2000) and Le Garrec (2001), the positive impact of
conventional PAYG retirement systems on economic growth goes through
the lengthening of training, while the negative impact in Docquier and Pad-
dison (2003) corresponds to the decrease of the proportion of individuals
who decide to train themselves when considering a xed training length. By
embeding both e¤ects, Le Garrec (2012) then shows that the positive e¤ect
always dominate the negative one, at least for low contribution rates.
In this article, we extend the literature into two directions. First, follow-
ing Le Garrec (2012), we consider investment in human capital both through
the proportion of individuals who decide to invest and the time they invest.
However, by not specifying a particular distribution of learning abilities, we
can provide explicit and general conditions so that the positive e¤ect asso-
ciated with the lengthening of training may be dominated by the negative
e¤ects, i.e. the decrease of the proportion of educated individuals. We then
show that economic growth may exhibit an inverse U-shaped pattern with
respect to the size of an actuarially fair retirement system whose pensions
are linked to the best or last years, while a NDC system has no impact
on economic growth. Second, we consider the aging process not through de-
creased fertility as is usual, but through increased longevity. It has important
consequences. Indeed, as increased longevity raises the value of investments
that pay over time, it also encourages investment in education as well docu-
mented in the literature4. Therefore, social security interacts with longevity
in determining the individual investment in education. We then show that
4See de la Croix and Licandro (1999), Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000), Boucekkine et al.
(2002), Cervellati and Sunde (2005, 2011), Soares (2005), Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney
(2009). Challenging the conventional wisdom, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) nd no e¤ect
of life expectancy on schooling.
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increased longevity may raise the size of a conventional retirement system
rate which maximizes economic growth. This result suggests that the op-
timal adjustment to aging could consist in increasing the size of existing
retirement systems rather than switching to notional systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present
the basic assumptions related to the age-earnings proles and the calculation
of pension benets. In section 3, we analyse optimal behaviors of individ-
uals and rms considering the basic assumptions. We assume in particular
that individuals di¤er in their learning abilities as in Docquier and Paddison
(2003) and Le Garrec (2012). In section 4, we specify the equilibrium features
whith actuarially fair retirement systems. In section 5, we then show that
actuarially fair retirement systems, depending on their size and on the cal-
culation of pension benets, can enhance economic growth. In section 6, we
then specify optimal adjusments regarding economic growth when longevity
increases. In the last section, we briey conclude.
2 Earnings prole and pension benets: ba-
sic assumptions
The model is an extended version of the Ben-Porath model (1967) with un-
certain lifetimes. Individuals live either for two or three periods: they are
respectively young, adult, and old. Survival is complete through adulthood.
Each adult has a probability  2 (0; 1) to survive to old age. The size of
the young generation is normalized to one at each date. Due to complete
survivance, the size of the adult generation is also equal to one at each date,
whereas the size of the retired generation is equal to . Aging then occurs in
the model through increased longevity.
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2.1 Human capital and age-earnings proles
When young, individuals go to school. During this period which corresponds
to primary and secondary education (compulsory schooling), individuals born
in t  1 learn basic knowledge represented by the average knowledge Zt 1 of
the contemporary working generation. In addition, they can choose to make
an e¤ort et 1 in learning (where et 1 = 0 or 1) to pass the nal secondary
school examination, qualifying for university entrance. In the second period,
those who have made the e¤ort can then complement their basic knowledge
by pursuing training during a period ht instead of entering directly the labor
market5. At the end of their complementary training, their human capital is
characterized by:
Zst = Bh

tZt 1, B > 0;  > 0 (1)
where  denotes the return to complementary training in terms of human
capital.
Skilled workers, those who have completed their training before entering
the labor market, are thus characterized by a rst period ht with no earnings.
Afterwards, they earn Zstwt, where wt is the wage rate per unit of e¤ective
labor. Earnings of skilled workersW st over their whole active period are thus:
W st = (1  ht)Zstwt (2)
and are then characterized by a steep prole. By contrast, unskilled workers
are characterized by the basic human capital during all their working period:
5In that case training is a full-time activity which can be assimilated to higher educa-
tion. We could have assumed alternatively that training is a part-time activity without
changing the qualitative results (see Le Garrec, 2005).
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Zut = Zt 1 (3)
and are then characterized by at age-earnings proles:
W ut = Z
u
t wt (4)
From eqs. (1)-(4), making sure that skilled workers earn more than un-
skilled workers during their whole active period requires that:
(1  ht)Bht > 1 (5)
In a simple way, the economy is then characterized in line with Lilliard
(1977) and Andolfatto et al. (2000) by age-earnings proles of workers in-
creased with the time spent in training and by high-school dropouts with at
age-earnings proles.
2.2 Pension benets
In conventional systems, the calculation of pension benets is specic to each
country, and sometimes can be very complex. In the theoretical literature on
social security6, two di¤erent parts are generally distinguished: a redistribu-
tive part (the Beveridgean part) characterized by a basic at-rate benet, and
an insurance part (the Bismarckian part) characterized by earnings-related
benets. The latter is not generally proportional to all contributions and
then not based on full lifetime average earnings (see OECD, 2007). It is
particularly the case in Greece and Spain where benets are only linked to
nal salary. It also used to be the case in Sweden before the 1994 legislation
6See Casamatta et al. (2000), Docquier and Paddison (2003), Sommacal (2006), Cremer
et al. (2007), Hachon (2010), Le Garrec (2011).
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introducing NDC systems. In France, before the Balladur reform of 1993,
earnings-related benets were linked to the ten best years, then gradually to
the 25 best years after the reform. In the United States, the 35 best years
are considered to calculate the benets, 20 in Norway.
Let us dene ~W it , i = s; u, as the representative earnings on which benets
are based in a conventional system. It does not matter which period is used
to calculate the unskilled representative earnings because the age-earnings
prole is consistently at. It follows that:
~W ut = W
u
t (6)
For the skilled workers, as the reference earnings ~W st corresponds to the
best or last years, it is specied as:
~W st = Z
s
twt (7)
Assuming that the basic at-rate benet pt+1 is linked to the contempo-
rary wage of unskilled workers7, the calculation of pension benets for any
worker in t in a conventional system is then given by:
pCONV;t+1 = t+1 ~Wt + t+1W
u
t+1 (8)
where t+1 represents the size of the at-rate component of the pension ben-
ets and t+1 the size of the earnings-related component.
As noted in the introduction, most conventional retirement systems of
industrialized economies are close to actuarial fairness. In terms of the re-
tirement system implicit return, i.e. the ratio between the expected pension
benets of an individual and the amount of his contributions, this means
that:
7It is designed to ensure that pensioners achieve some minimum standard of living.
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puCONV;t
W ut 1
 p
s
CONV;t
W st 1
(9)
where  denotes the public pension system contribution rate, and pit de-
notes the pension benets in t of a worker of type i in t   1, i = u; s8. If
puCONV;t
Wut 1
>
psCONV;t
W st 1
, then the retirement system is scally favorable to low-
income earners. In this case the system is progressive. In the opposite case,
puCONV;t
Wut 1
<
psCONV;t
W st 1
, it is regressive.
Consider alternatively a NDC system. In that case, individual contribu-
tions are noted on individual accounts which are credited with a factor of
return  . By denition, such a pure contributory system whose pensions are
calculated proportionally to all contributions is actuarially fair. Explicitly
adjusted to life expectancy, pension benets are then as follows:
pNDC;t+1 =
 t+1

Wt (10)
For convenience, we will further note the calculation of pension benets
as:
pt+1 =  (pCONV;t+1) + (1  ) pNDC;t+1 (11)
where  = 1 for a conventional system,  = 0 for a NDC system.
8If we had considered socioeconomic inequalities in mortality, actuarial fairness would
have been dened as
upuCONV;t
Wut 1
 
spsCONV;t
W st 1
, where s  u.
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3 Optimal behaviors
3.1 Individuals
As specied in the previous section, individuals live for three periods. They
invest in education in the rst and possibly in the second period, work in
the second one and retire in the third one with probability . Preferences of
an individual of type x born in t   1 are described by the following utility
function:
Ux = ln ct +  ln dt+1   xet 1 (12)
where ct and dt+1 denote, respectively, his consumption when adult and when
old9, and   1 denotes the subjective discount factor. The utility from un-
certain lifetime consumption is based on Yaari (1965), as in Abel (1985) and
in Zhang et al. (2001, 2003). x denotes the utility cost of schooling ef-
fort, where  2 [0;1) represents learning ability. As shown by Huggett et
al. (2006), earnings di¤erences are rst explained by di¤erences in learning
ability across individuals. In our setting, a talented child characterized by
 = 0 endures no cost in making the e¤ort. By contrast, a lazy or untal-
ented child characterized by  ! 1 will endure an innite cost and will
then always choose not to make the e¤ort, i.e. et 1 = 0. Note that  can be
considered as an inherited (perfectly here) trait which represents both family
background and genetic transmission10. We denote G() the cumulative dis-
9As in Boldrin and Montes (2005) and Docquier et al. (2007), we assume that the
only decision of children concerns education as their consumption is part of their parents
consumption. As a consequence and without loss of generality, consumption when young
does not appear in the utility function.
10Stating that earnings are very signicantly tied to the earnings of the parents (Bowles
and Gintis, 2002, dAddio, 2007), this suggests that the intergenerational earnings per-
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tribution function of learning ability through the population, and we assume
it is of class C2.
During the second life period, individuals consume a part of their dispos-
able income, and save via a perfect annuity market such as:
ct + st = Wt (1  ) (13)
where st denotes private savings.
In the third life period, old-age survivors are retired. They get back their
savings with interest, receive their pension from the public retirement system
and consume their wealth. The budget constraint is then:
dt+1 =
Rt+1

st + pt+1 (14)
where Rt+1 denotes the real interest factor. Note that, with a perfect annuity
market, old-age survivors share the savings of deceased individuals. The
expected return to savings is then equal to the actuarially fair factor Rt+1

as
in Zhang et al. (2001). The alternative would be the existence of unvolontary
bequests as in Abel (1985) and Zhang et al. (2003).
Let 
it = W
i
t (1  )+ p
i
t+1
Rt+1
be the expected lifetime income of a worker
of type i, i = u; s. Considering the calculation of pension benets (11), an
individual who has chosen to make the e¤ort at school will maximize his
sistence is based on the inheritability of learning ability within families. Supporting such
a view, education is a major contributor to intergenerational earnings mobility and edu-
cational di¤erences tend to persist across generations (dAddio, 2007). Nevertheless, as
shown by Bowles and Gintis (2002), it does not imply that the intergenerational earnings
determination is only based on genetic transmission. Learning ability also reects non-
cognitive personality traits such as, for example, a taste for learning at school which can
be inuenced by the family background as much as by the genes.
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lifetime income by spending the following time in training during his second
life period:
ht = inf

h0

1 +
1
1  
t+1
Rt+1

; 1

(15)
where h0 = 
1+
is the training length with no retirement system.
Proposition 1 Linking pension benets to partial earnings history generates
an incentive to be trained longer.
Conventional retirement systems whose pension benets are based, even
partially, on the best or last years generate an incentive for longer training.
Initially, the lengthening of training has a negative e¤ect on income. Dur-
ing this period individuals have indeed no earnings capacity. However, they
earn more afterwards. In addition, as pensions are linked to the best or last
years they also benet, all things being equal, from an increase in their ben-
ets. Following equation (15), individuals who undertake training may nd
it protable to be trained longer as an investment in their pension benets.
Note that this incentive disappears completely if pension benets are based
on full lifetime average earnings ( = 0), or if the system is totally at-rate
(t+1 = 0). Moreover, this incentive is weaker as the interest rate increases.
Indeed, the higher the interest rate, the lower the present actuarial value of
pension benets.
To summarize, the incentive to be trained longer, generated by conven-
tional retirement systems, is due to the interaction of two factors:
 pension benets are linked to the best or last years
 training results in steeper age-earnings proles
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The utility maximization of an individual subject to budgetary con-
straints (13) and (14) leads to the following saving function:
st =

1 + 
Wt (1  )  
1 + 
pt+1
Rt+1
(16)
By reducing simultaneously the disposable income and the need for fu-
ture income, a retirement system reduces private savings. This result holds
irrespective of the calculation of pension benets and their nancing.
Last, an individual will choose to make the e¤ort at school if the op-
portunity of complementary training entails a monetary benet higher than
the utility cost associated with the e¤ort, i.e. if (1 + ) ln
st   xet 1 
(1 + ) ln
ut . Considering an interior solution, the proportion of individu-
als qt who choose to be trained in t (and then to make the school e¤ort in
t  1) and become skilled workers is dened by:
qt = et 1 = G [(1 + ) ln It] (17)
where It =

st

ut
represents the lifetime income inequality between skilled and
unskilled workers in t. Following (17), the higher this inequality, the larger
the proportion of individuals incited to be trained: dqt
dIt
> 0.
3.2 Firms
We consider a competitive sector characterized by a representative rm pro-
ducing a good, which can be either consumed or invested, according to a
Cobb-Douglas technology with constant return to scale:
Yt = F (Kt; L
u
t ; L
s
t) = AK

t (Z
u
t L
u
t + (1  ht)ZstLst)1  ; 0 <  < 1; (18)
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where Yt denotes the output, Kt the physical capital stock, Lit the number of
worker of type i in t, i = u; s, and A the total factor productivity. Assuming
for simplicity as in Docquier and Paddison (2003) and Le Garrec (2012)
that skilled and unskilled labors are perfect substitutes11, Ht = Zut L
u
t +
(1  ht)ZstLst represents the labor supply in e¢ ciency units.
Denoting per capita e¢ cient capital by kt = KtHt and assuming a total
capital depreciation, the optimal conditions resulting from the maximization
of the prot are:
Rt = Ak
 1
t (19)
wt = A (1  ) kt (20)
Before studying the impact of retirement systems and the calculation of
pension benets on economic growth, we have to characterize the equilibrium
and its properties.
4 Equilibrium
The economy is composed of four markets corresponding to the unskilled
labor, the skilled labor, the physical capital and the good. In a closed-
economy setting, the general equilibrium can be obtained by considering only
the clearing of three markets, as according to the Walras law, the fourth is
necessarily cleared. In our case, we consider the clearing of the following
11Assuming alternatively they are imperfect substitutes would a¤ect the skill choice
by introducing a wage premium for human capital. However, it would not change the
training length as dened in eq. (15) at all. The incentive to be trained longer as specied
in Proposition 1 would then not be a¤ected.
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markets:
unskilled labor:
Lut = (1  qt) (21)
skilled labor:
Lst = qt (22)
physical capital:
Kt+1 = qts
s
t + (1  qt) sut (23)
4.1 PAYG social security and the capital accumulation
Retirement systems have PAYG features, i.e. within a period, pension ben-
ets are nanced by contributions of workers of the same period. In other
words, retirement systems transfer workersincome towards pensioners. Since
workers are either skilled or unskilled, the social security balanced budget is
dened as follows:
Lut 1p
u
t + L
s
t 1p
s
t =  [L
u
tW
u
t + L
s
tW
s
t ] (24)
Since at date t there is a proportion qt and 1   qt of respectively skilled
and unskilled workers as specied in eqs. (21) and (22), the balanced budget
of the retirement system (24), with eqs. (1)-(11), is rewritten as:
t =




qt (1  ht)Bht + 1  qt
  t wt
wt 1
if  = 1 (25)
or:
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 t =
qt (1  ht)Bht + 1  qt
qt 1 (1  ht 1)Bht 1 + 1  qt 1
 
qt 1Bht 1 + 1  qt 1
 wt
wt 1
if  = 0
(26)
Considering the social security balanced budget, either eq. (25) for a
conventional system or eq. (26) for a NDC system, and the physical capital
market clearing (23), with eqs. (1)-(11), (16), (19) and (20), the dynamics
of capital accumulation in the model can be expressed independently of the
calculation of pension benets as:
kt+1

qt+1 (1  ht+1)Bht+1 + 1  qt+1

(27)
=
A (1  ) (1  )
 (1 + ) +  (1  )
qt (1  ht)Bht + 1  qt
qtBht + 1  qt
kt
As retirement systems reduce private savings (eq. 16), all things being
equal, PAYG retirement systems are harmful for the accumulation of phys-
ical capital:
@ 1 
(1+)+(1 )
@
< 0 (eq. 27). In addition, as q and h are both
forward-looking variables, their specication is crucial to determine the dy-
namic properties of the model and the convergence towards its steady-state
(balanced growth) path.
4.2 Human capital and actuarial fairness
As is obvious, a NDC system ( = 0) is actuarially fair. As noted in the intro-
duction and characterized by eq. (9), most conventional retirement systems
in the industrial world are also close to actuarial fairness.
Proposition 2 Conventional retirement systems whose pensions are linked
to the best or last years are actuarially fair if including a at-rate com-
ponent indexed on the unskilled earnings, pt = tW
u
t , such as t = et =
Bh1+t 1
Bht 1 1


qt(1 ht)Bht+1 qt
qt 1(1 ht 1)Bht 1+1 qt 1
.
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If t > et, the retirement system is scally favorable to low-income earn-
ers,
puCONV;t
Wut 1
>
psCONV;t
W st 1
, and is then progressive. In the opposite case, t < et,
it is regressive. This feature is easily understandable. On one hand, the at-
rate part of the pension benets is clearly favorable to low-income earners:
they receive as much as high-income earners whereas they have contributed
less. A at-rate system is obviously progressive. On the other hand, the
pension part which is linked to the best or last years, characterized by t,
is favorable to high-income earners as they have a steeper lifetime income
prole, as explained by Lindbeck and Persson (2003) and Bozio and Piketty
(2008). If there is no at-rate part then the system is regressive. There-
fore, there is a unique combination of the at-rate and earning-related parts,
the one dened in Proposition 2, that characterizes actuarial fairness in a
conventional system.
Consider an actuarially fair retirement system, i.e. either  = 0 or  = 1
and t+1 = et+1. In such a case, the lifetime income inequality It = 
st
ut
becomes It =
W st
Wut
. Using eqs. (1)-(4), the proportion of skilled workers in t
dened by eq. (17) becomes:
qt = G
 
[1 + ] ln

(1  ht)Bht

(28)
In this conguration, the choice for a young individual to make the e¤ort
at school in t 1 to become a skilled worker in t depends only on his personal
talent, his life expectancy and the length of the training he anticipates to
complete. As h0 corresponds to max

(1  h)Bh	, we can deduce from eq.
(28) that any increase in the training length compared to the basic level
h0 will lead to a decrease in the skilled workers proportion: @qt
@ht

hth0
 0.
Following Proposition 1, we can then expect that conventional actuarially
fair retirement systems whose pension benets are based on partial earnings
history reduce the proportion of skilled workers.
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When the retirement system is purely contributory as a NDC system
( = 0), it has no impact on the training length in the second period of life
(eq. 17). By contrast, as characterized by eq. (15), linking pension benets
to partial earnings history as in a conventional system ( = 1) generates
an incentive to be trained longer which depends crucially on the actual-
ized Bismarckian component t+1
Rt+1
. Using eqs. (19)-(20) and (25)-(27) yields
t+1
Rt+1
=
h
(1 ht)Bht 1
Bht 1
i
(1 )(1 )
(1+)+(1 ) . Thus, the training length according to
the social security features can be summarized as:
ht =
8<: h0h0 h1 + (1 )
(1+)+(1 )
(1 ht)Bht 1
Bht 1
i if  = 0
if  = 1 and t+1 = et+1 (29)
If  = 1 and t+1 = et+1, we derive from (29) that lim
h!h0
RHS > h0
and lim
h!1
RHS < h0. In this case, the training is expressed as a function
ht = h ( ; ) such as h0  h ( ; )  1. In the case of a NDC system, as
the latter has no impact on the training length, we will note conveniently
ht = h ( ; ), where  = 0, i.e. h (0; ) = h0 = 1+ 8. Thereafter, as the
skill choice depends only on the training length and on the longevity (eq.
28), it can also be expressed as qt = q ( ; ) = Q (h ( ; ) ; ), where  = 1
or  = 0. In the latter case, qt = Q (h (0; ) ; ) = Q (h0; ) corresponds to an
unchanged proportion of skilled workers in t compared to a situation with
no retirement system: q (0; ) = G
 
[1 + ] ln

(1  h0)Bh0.
4.3 Dynamic properties
As underlined by eqs. (28) and (29), human capital variables are in their
steady-state values independently of the calculation of pension benets. Ac-
cordingly, considering an actuarially fair retirement system, the physical cap-
ital accumulation dynamics (27) can be rewritten as:
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kt+1 =
A (1  ) (1  )
 (1 + ) +  (1  )
1
Q (h ( ; ) ; )Bh ( ; ) + 1 Q (h ( ; ) ; )k

t
(30)
Since  < 1, given k0 > 0, the model has good dynamic properties and
converges to its steady-state (balanced growth) path characterized by h =
h ( ; ), q = Q (h ( ; ) ; ) and k =
h
A(1 )(1 )
(1+)+(1 )
1
qBh+1 q
i 1
1 
, where
 = 0 or  = 1.
As the convergence is veried, the impact of retirement systems and the
calculation of pension benets on investment in human capital and on growth
can now be discussed.
5 Social security and economic growth
On the balanced growth path, we deduce from the labor market clearing
relations (21) and (22) as well as eqs. (1), (3) and (18) the economic growth
rate g:
1 + g =
Y
Y 1
=
Z
Z 1
= 1 + q
 
Bh   1 (31)
In line with the new growth literature initiated by Lucas (1988) and
Romer (1990), equation (31) stresses that long-term economic growth posi-
tively depends on the rate of knowledge accumulation which is driven both by
the proportion of skilled workers in the economy (i.e. those who have made
the e¤ort at school) and the length of training. From this perspective, it is
worth noting that, after mixed empirical supports (see Benhabib and Spiegel,
1994; Bils and Klenow, 2000), the positive impact of education on economic
growth has received more recently a clear support from empirical studies con-
ducted with improved data quality (see de la Fuente and Domenech, 2006;
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Cohen and Soto, 2007). We then study how NDC and conventional systems
impact di¤erently economic growth through change in the training length
and the proportion of skilled workers.
5.1 NDC systems
A pure contributory NDC system ( = 0) has no impact on the training
length (eq. 17). As a consequence, as underlined in equation (28), it has
also no impact on the proportion of skilled workers. Indeed, in that case, as
pension benets are proportional to all contributions the retirement system
can no longer alter the skill choice. NDC systems are then characterized by
an unchanged investment in human capital, i.e. h = h0 and q = Q (h0; ),
and it follows that:
Proposition 3 NDC systems have no impact on economic growth.
5.2 Conventional systems
Consider alternativelly conventional systems whose pensions are linked to the
best or last years, i.e.  = 1. Admitting they are actuarially fair, i.e.  = e,
following eq. (29) the training is specied by h = h0
h
1 + (1 )
(1+)+(1 )
(1 h)Bh 1
Bh 1
i
,
where lim
h!h0
RHS > h0 and lim
h!1
RHS < h0. This equation thus denes a rela-
tion between the training and the contribution rate of the retirement system
such as h = h ( ; ) < 1 and @h
@
> 0. In addition, as the skill choice is
specied by q = G
 
[1 + ] ln

(1  h)Bh where h  h0, it follows that
@q
@
 0. The negative impact of conventional systems on the proportion of
skilled workers can appear at rst glance counter-intuitive. Indeed, as such a
system results in the lengthening of the skilled workerstraining, it raises the
di¤erence between skilled and unskilled workersearnings. However, from a
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life cycle perspective, with no retirement system or with a pure contributory
system (Proposition 1), individuals who decide to undertake training choose
the length h0 which maximizes their expected lifetime income; h0 thus max-
imizes the lifetime income inequality between skilled and unskilled workers.
A lengthening of the training thus raises lifetime income inequality when
h < h0. Conversely, when h > h0, a lengthening of the training reduces life-
time income inequality because we move away from the individually optimal
training length. Therefore, even if the retirement system does not carry out
transfers from high-income to low-income earners, we know from Proposition
1 that such a earnings-related pension benet formula generates an incentive
for longer training. Skilled workers are then encouraged to train themselves
more than their individually optimal level. Consequently, actuarially fair re-
tirement systems whose pensions are linked to the best or last years reduce
lifetime income inequality compared to a situation with no retirement system
(or purely contributory as NDC systems) and then reduce the proportion of
skilled workers (eq. 17). Denoting "hQ the elasticity of Q with respect to h,
the following Proposition then holds:
Proposition 4 As long as 0 < Q (h0; ) < 1, assuming d2G (:)  0 8  0,
 "hQ > Bh

Bh 1 for  = 1 is a necessary and su¢ cient condition such as
economic growth exhibits an inverse U-shaped pattern with respect to the size
of an actuarially fair retirement system whose pensions are linked to the best
or last years.
By reducing the proportion of skilled workers in the economy, actuarially
fair conventional systems negatively impact economic growth. On the other
hand, they incite skilled workers to train longer. For su¢ ciently low size
of the system, the latter e¤ect always dominates the former and we can
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stress a positive impact of PAYG retirement systems on economic growth as
empirically reported by Sala-i-Martin (1996) and Zhang and Zhang (2004).
Initiated by the lengthening of training, the underlined mechanism is directly
related to Kemnitz and Wigger (2000) and Le Garrec (2001)12.
However, when the size of the system increases, everything else being
equal, the leading e¤ect can reverse if lifetime income inequality strongly
matters in the skill choice, or more formally if  "hQ > Bh

Bh 1 , where  "hQ =
"IQ
 
h
1 h   

, "IQ being the elasticity of Q with respect to I. In that case,
similarly to Docquier and Paddison (2003), conventional PAYG retirement
systems based on partial earnings history are harmful for economic growth
because they rst reduce the proportion of skilled workers. We then shed
light on the existence of an inverse U-shaped pattern of economic growth
with respect to the size of an actuarially fair retirement system whose pen-
sions are linked to the best or last years. Moreover, it sustains the exis-
tence of an optimally designed retirement system regarding economic growth
which is not an NDC system but a conventional system based on partial
earnings history. At least if its size is not too high compared to the opti-
mal size. Indeed, in that case economic growth with a conventional system
could be potentially lower than with no system or with a NDC system. To
illustrate this point, consider for example any distribution characterized by
(1 + ) ln
h
(1  h (1; ))Bh (1; )
i
< min < (1 + ) ln
h
(1  h (0; ))Bh (0; )
i
.
In this case, it exists ~ < 1 such as   ~ entails g = 0 with a conventional
system whereas g =
 
Bh0   1Q (h0; ) > 0 with a NDC system (or with
12In Zhang (1995) and Zhang and Zhang (2003), PAYG retirement systems result in
more growth by reducing fertility of altruistic parents who consequently invest more in
the education of their children. In Sala-i-Martin (1996), old workers are associated with
negative externalities in the average stock of human capital. By inducing earlier retirement,
PAYG retirement systems then stimulate growth.
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no retirement system). It stresses the importance of evaluating the impact
of aging on economic growth and the size of the conventional system which
maximizes it to determine the desirable adjustment.
6 Aging and optimal growth
6.1 Longevity, education and growth
As noted in the introduction, the coming century will be characterized by
increased longevity. Nowadays equal to 80 years, life expectancy at birth
should reach 85 years in 2050 in Western Europe (United Nations, 2009).
It will have important consequences on public nance. It will have also im-
portant consequences for individuals, involving signicant changes in their
choices. First, individuals will need to nance a longer period in retirement.
With low pension benets, they will inevitably need to save more before re-
tirement. As increased longevity raises the value of investments that pay over
time, it will also encourage investment in education. For an economy with
high life expectancy, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000) have hence estimated the
elasticity of schooling years with respect to life expectancy to 0:7. Allowing
economic growth to be driven by investment in education, we can also expect
from an increased longevity a positive impact on economic growth.
Proposition 5 With no retirement system (or with a NDC system), in-
creased longevity stimulates economic growth by increasing the proportion of
skilled workers while letting unchanged the time they have spent to be trained.
This result is directly related to Proposition 1. Indeed, if there is no
retirement system or a NDC system, the training length is h = h0 = 
1+
. In
that case, there is then no impact of aging on the length of training. The
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impact only comes from a change in the proportion of skilled workers such
as, following eq. (28), @Q
@
= dG (:)  ln

(1  h0)Bh0  0.
By contrast, in the case of an actuarially fair conventional system ( = 1
and  = e) it follows from eq. (29) that the training length increases with
longevity: @h
@
=

(1 h)Bh 1
Bh 1
(1 )[+(1 )]
[(1+)+(1 )]2 
1+

1+
(1 )
(1+)+(1 )
Bh(Bh 1 )
(Bh 1)2
 > 013 8 > 0. Indeed, such a
retirement system provides incentives to invest in pension benets through
longer training. As increased longevity favors investments that pay out over
time, it then increases the training length. The impact on the proportion
of skilled workers is therefore no more trivial. On one hand, everything else
being equal, an increased longevity encourages individuals to become skilled
worker: @Q
@
 0. On the other hand, as h > h0, the induced lengthening of
the training reduces lifetime income inequality and then @Q
@h
 0.
Proposition 6 With an actuarially fair retirement system whose pensions
are linked to the best or last years, increased longevity enhances economic
growth both by increasing the proportion of skilled workers and the time they
have spent to be trained if the latter is moderate enough.
Formally, the condition in Proposition 6 applies as long as @h
@
 
1+
ln[(1 h)Bh]
1
1 h  h
.
As lim
=0
@h
@
= 0 and lim
=0
 
1
1 h   h

= 0, it is always the case at least if the size
of the retirement system is su¢ ciently low.
6.2 Optimal growth
An important distinction must be made between the two systems when con-
sidering aging. As a NDC system has no impact on economic growth, no
adjustment is required when the population is aging. By contrast, if a con-
ventional system can enhance economic growth, it can also be potentially
13Note that Bh   1   =  1  1 hh   Bh   1+ h (1  h)Bh   1  0 8h  h0.
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harmful if its size is too high compared to the optimal size. We must then
study the evolution of the latter to verify, at a minimum, that an unchanged
size does not become harmful for economic growth, i.e. that the optimal size
is not decreasing with longevity. Assuming   = argmax

f1 + gg < 1, it
follows from Proposition 4 that:
sign
d 
d
= sign
8><>:
@2Q
@@h
h
q
  @Q
@h
h
q2
@Q
@
+@h
@

 B2h 1
(Bh 1)2
+ @
2Q
@h2
h
q
+ @Q
@h
1
q
   @Q
@h
2 h
q2
 9>=>; (32)
On one hand, assuming d2G (:)  0 8  0 yields @2Q
@h2
 0 and then
@h
@

 B2h 1
(Bh 1)2
+ @
2Q
@h2
h
q
+ @Q
@h
1
q
   @Q
@h
2 h
q2

 0. However, at least if consider-
ing low levels of  , the length of training is weakly related to longevity.
As underlined in Proposition 3, if  = 0, @h
@
= 0. Considering then a
su¢ ciently low impact of longevity on the length of training entails that
signd

d
= sign
n
@2Q
@@h
h
q
  @Q
@h
h
q2
@Q
@
o
, where @Q
@h
h
q2
@Q
@
 0. It follows that if the
negative impact on the proportion of skilled workers initiated by the train-
ing lenghthening is reduced by the increased longevity, @
2Q
@@h
 0, then the
optimal size   increases. Such a condition is veried if the elasticity of the
density function is, in absolute value, higher than unity:  "dG  1.
Proposition 7 Assuming   = argmax

f1 + gg < 1, if the length of training
is weakly related to longevity,  "dG  1 is a su¢ cient condition such as a
marginal increase in longevity raises the size of a conventional retirement
system rate which maximizes economic growth.
Note that the condition  "dG  1 in Proposition 7 is not restrictive.
Let us consider for example a Pareto distribution. In that case, the density
function dG () = 

min
+1
8  min, 0 otherwise, where min > 0 and  > 0.
It follows that  "dG =  d2G dG = 1+ > 1, i.e. the condition always holds.
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For policy-making, as underlined by Le Garrec (2005), maximizing eco-
nomic growth is equivalent to maximizing an intertemporal social welfare if
the weight assigned to future generations is high enough. From this perspec-
tive, as there is no guarantee that the e¤ective size  of conventional systems
corresponds to the optimal size  , di¤erent congurations can arise with
increased longevity. Starting from  0    (0), increased longevity must
be associated with increased contributions to obtain the optimal economic
growth and then increased social welfare. Note nevertheless that increased
longevity with unchanged pension benets can dene a new contribution rate
higher than the optimal rate. In such a case, both increased contributions
and lower pension benets are required to satisfy  1 =   (1).
Starting from  0 >   (0), the desirable adjustment resulting from in-
creased longevity can also corresponds to increased contributions if  0 
  (1), but most likely to decreased benets. If  0 > 
 (1), as contri-
butions can not optimally increase, a reduction of pension benets is cer-
tainly benecial. Moreover, a reduction of contributions such as  1 =   (1)
can also be desirable for all generations. Indeed, as suggested by Belan et
al. (1998), if such a reduction results in a signicant increase in economic
growth, a Pareto-improving transition may exist. If such a transition does
not exist and if the conventional system is harmful for economic growth,
g (1;  0) < g (1;  = 0), a switch to NDC system can then be considered
to increase economic growth and then social welfare. Note however that,
as PAYG retirement systems seem to enhance economic growth as empir-
ically reported by Sala-i-Martin (1996) and Zhang and Zhang (2004), i.e.
g (0;  0) > g (0;  = 0), such a switch towards NDC systems associated
with increased longevity can not be optimal. The adjustment resulting from
increased longevity which appears most likely optimal is then an increase in
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contribution rates.
7 Conclusion
Equal to 80 years, life expectancy at birth in Western Europe should reach
85 years in 2050 (United Nations, 2009). Financed on a PAYG basis, public
retirement systems will have then to cope with the increasingly larger number
of pensioners compared to the number of contributors. Changes are unavoid-
able and of major importance in OECDscountries. In 2005, the payment
of pension benets represented 38% of all their public social expenditures.
As a matter of fact, retirement systems are the major program of industrial
countriesredistributive policies and their importance should still grow with
the aging of their population.
Claiming the broad ine¢ ciency of PAYG retirement systems (being ac-
cused of low return and of distorting individual behaviors), some economists
as Feldstein (1995a, 1995b, 1996) stress that these nancial di¢ culties give
opportunities to move to fully funded systems. However, replacing conven-
tional PAYG systems by nancial -or funded- dened contribution (FDC)
systems would involve such a large cost of transition that it appears socially
and politically di¢ cult to implement such a reform in Western democracies.
For that reason, in recent years a large focus has been put on non-nancial
-or notional- dened contribution (NDC) systems as legislated in Sweden in
1994. By basing benets on individual accounts, NDC systems have un-
doubtedly desirable features in terms of transparency. However, as existing
retirement systems (except in Anglo-Saxon countries) appear close to actu-
arial fairness, we can not expect from NDC systems a signicant decrease
in negative incentive e¤ects. In many respects, introducing a NDC system
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largely involves moving from a dened benet to a dened contribution sys-
tem aiming at the contribution ratesstabilization. Objective which can be
achieved similarly within the scope of more conventional dened benet sys-
tems. As stressed by Börsch-Supan (2006), cleverly designed conventional
retirement systems can often do the same job as NDC systems. As shown in
this article, they can even do better.
In particular, as most conventional retirement systems have pension ben-
ets linked only to partial earnings history, they can stimulate economic
growth by promoting the accumulation of human capital, at least if their
size is not too high. When considering the aging process, regarding eco-
nomic growth, the optimal adjustment is then likely an increase in the size of
existing retirement systems rather than a switch to notional systems. Such
recommandation appears strengthened when observing in addition that ac-
tuarially fair retirement systems whose pensions are linked to the best or last
years lower lifetime income inequality while NDC systems do not. More gen-
erally, moving to a NDC system, by nature purely contributory, denitively
closes the debate about the progressivity of the retirement system which is
an important one in democracy. Following Le Garrec (2012), compared to
any actuarially fair system, greater progressivity would result in negative
incentive e¤ects that would lead to less economic growth, but also to less
lifetime inequality. To decide whether greater progressivity involving less
lifetime inequality would be worth the cost in terms of economic growth, an
intertemporal social welfare, as used in Boadway et al. (1991), Marchand
et al. (1996), Le Garrec (2005) and Docquier et al. (2007), would then be
interesting.
31
References
[1] Abel A. (1985), Precautionary saving and accidental bequests, American
Economic Review, 75(4), pp. 777-791.
[2] Acemoglu D. and Johnson S. (2007), Disease and development: the e¤ect
of life expectancy on economic growth, Journal of Political Economy,
115(6), pp. 925-985.
[3] Andolfatto D., Ferrall C., Gomme P. (2000), Life-cycle learning, earning,
income and wealth, mimeo, November.
[4] Belan P., Michel P. and Pestieau P. (1998), Pareto-improving social
security reform, Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 23(2), pp. 119-125.
[5] Benhabib J. and Spiegel M.M. (1994), The role of human capital in eco-
nomic development: evidence from aggregate cross-country data, Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics, 34(2), pp.143-173.
[6] Ben-Porath, Y. (1967), The production of human capital and the life
cycle of earnings, Journal of Political Economy, 75, pp. 352-365.
[7] Bils M. and Klenow P. (2000), Does schooling cause growth?, American
Economic Review, 90(5), pp. 1160-83.
[8] Boadway R., Marchand M. and Pestieau P. (1991), Pay-as-you-go social
security in a changing environment, Journal of Population Economics,
4, pp. 257-280.
[9] Boldrin M. and Montes A. (2005), The intergenerational State education
and pensions, Review of Economic Studies, 72(3), pp. 651-664.
32
[10] Börsch-Supan A. (2006), What are NDC systems? What do they bring
to reform strategies?, in Pension Reform: Issues and Prospects for Non-
Financial Dened Contribution (NDC) Schemes, R. Holzmann and E.
Palmer eds., chap. 3, The World Bank.
[11] Boucekkine R., de la Croix D. and Licandro O. (2002), Vintage human
capital, demographic trends and endogenous growth, Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 104, pp. 340-375.
[12] Bowles S. and Gintis H. (2002), The inheritance of inequality, Journal
of Economic Perspective, 16(3), pp. 3-30.
[13] Bozio A. and Piketty T. (2008), Pour un nouveau système de retraite:
Des comptes individuels de cotisations nancés par répartition, Collec-
tion du CEPREMAP, éditions Rue dUlm.
[14] Brown J., Coronado, J. L. and Fullerton, D. (2006), The progressivity of
social security, NBER Papers on Retirement Research Center Projects,
NB06-10, December.
[15] Burkhauser R. and Walick J. (1981), Disentangling the annuity from
the redistributive aspects of social security in United States, Review of
Income and Wealth, vol 28, pp 401-422.
[16] Casamatta G., Cremer H. and Pestieau P. (2000), The political economy
of social security, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 102(3), pp. 503-
522.
[17] Cervellati M. and Sunde U. (2005), Human capital, life expectancy,
and the process of development, American Economic Review, 95(5), pp.
1653-1672.
33
[18] Cervellati M. and Sunde U. (2011), Life expectancy and economic
growth: The role of the demographic transition, Journal of Economic
Growth, 16(2), pp. 99-133.
[19] Cigno A. (2008), Is there a social security tax wedge?, Labour Eco-
nomics, 15(1), pp.6877.
[20] Cohen D. and Soto M. (2007), Growth and education good data, good
results, Journal of Economic growth, 12(1), pp. 51-76.
[21] Coronado, J. L., Fullerton, D. and Glass, T. (1999), Distributional im-
pacts of proposed changes to the social security system, NBER WP
6989, March.
[22] Coronado, J. L., Fullerton, D. and Glass, T. (2000), The progressivity
of social security, NBER WP 7520, February.
[23] Cremer H., De Donder P., Maldonado D., Pestieau P. (2007), Voting
over type and generosity of a pension system when some individuals are
myopic, Journal of Public Economics, 91, pp. 2041-2061.
[24] dAddio, A. C. (2007), Intergenerational transmission of disadvantage:
mobility or immobility across generations?, OECD Social, Employment
and Migration Working Papers 52, OECD Publishing.
[25] Deaton A. and C. Paxton (1998), Aging and inequality in income and
health, American Economic Review, 88(2), pp. 248-253.
[26] Deaton A. and C. Paxton (1999), Mortality, education, income and in-
equality among american cohort, NBER WP 7140, May.
[27] de la Croix D. and Licandro O. (1999), Life expectancy and endogenous
growth, Economics Letters, 65, pp. 255-263.
34
[28] de la Fuente A. and Domenech A. (2006), Human capital in growth
regressions: how much di¤erence does data quality make?, Journal of
the European Economic Association, 4(1), pp. 1-36.
[29] Docquier F. and Paddison O. (2003), Social security benet rules,
growth and inequality, Journal of Macroeconomics, 25, pp. 47-71.
[30] Docquier F., Paddison O. and Pestieau P. (2007), Optimal accumula-
tion in an endogenous growth setting with human capital, Journal of
Economic Theory, 134, pp. 361-378.
[31] Feldstein M. (1995a), Fiscal policies, capital formation, and capitalism,
European Economic Review, 39, pp 399-420.
[32] Feldstein M. (1995b), Would privatizing Social Security raise economic
welfare?, NBER WP 5281.
[33] Feldstein M. (1996), The missing piece in policy analysis: Social Security
reform, American Economic Review, 86(2), pp. 1-14.
[34] Feldstein M., Dicks-Mireaux L. and Poterba J. (1983), The e¤ective taxe
rate and the pretax rate of return, Journal of Public Economics, 21(2),
pp129-158.
[35] Garrett D. (1995), The e¤ects of di¤erential mortality rates on the pro-
gressivity of social security, Economic Inquiry, vol 33(3), pp 457-475.
[36] Gustman, A. and Steinmeier, T. (2001), How e¤ective is redistribution
under the social security benet formula?, Journal of Public Economics,
82, pp. 1-28.
[37] Hachon C. (2010), Do Beveridgian pension systems increase growth?,
Journal of Population Economics, 23, pp. 825-831.
35
[38] Huggett M., Ventura G. and Yaron A. (2006), Human capital and earn-
ings distribution dynamics, Journal of Monetary Economics, 53(2), pp.
265-290.
[39] Jayachandran S. and Lleras-Muney A. (2009), Life expectancy and hu-
man capital investments: evidence from maternal mortality declines,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(1), pp. 349-398.
[40] Kalemli-Ozcan S., Ryder H. and Weil D. (2000), Mortality decline, hu-
man capital investment, and economic growth, Journal of Development
Economics, 62, pp. 1-23.
[41] Kemnitz, A. and Wigger, B. (2000), Growth and social security: the
role of human capital, European Journal of Political Economy, 16, pp.
673-683.
[42] Le Garrec (2001), Systèmes de retraite par répartition, mode de calcul
des droits à pension et croissance, Louvain Economic Review, 67(4), pp.
357-380.
[43] Le Garrec (2005), Social security, inequality and growth,WP n2005-22,
OFCE/Sciences Po, December.
[44] Le Garrec (2012), Social security, income inequality and growth, Journal
of Pension Economics and Finance, 11(1), pp. 53-70.
[45] Lillard, L. (1977), Inequality: earnings vs. human capital, American
Economic Review, vol 67(2), pp. 42-53.
[46] Lindbeck A. and Persson M. (2003), The gains from pension reform,
Journal of Economic Literature, 41(1), pp. 74-112.
36
[47] Lucas R.E. (1988), On the mechanics of economic development, Journal
of Monetary Economics, 21, pp. 3-42.
[48] Marchand M., Michel P. and Pestieau P. (1996), Optimal intergenera-
tional transfers in an endogenous growth model with fertility changes,
European Journal of Political Economy, 12, pp. 33-48.
[49] OECD (2007), Pensions at a glance: public policies across OECD coun-
tries.
[50] Palmer E. (2006), What is NDC?, in Pension Reform: Issues and
Prospects for Non-Financial Dened Contribution (NDC) Schemes, R.
Holzmann and E. Palmer eds., chap. 2, The World Bank.
[51] Romer P. (1990), Endogenous technical change, Journal of Political
Economy, 98(5), pp. S71S102.
[52] Sala-i-Martin X. (1996), A Positive Theory of Social Security, Journal
of Economic Growth, 1(2), pp 277-304.
[53] Saint-Paul G. (1992), Fiscal policy in an endogeneous growth model,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(4), pp 1243-1259.
[54] Soares R. (2005), Mortality reductions, educational attainment, and fer-
tility choice, American Economic Review, 95(3), pp. 580-601.
[55] Sommacal A. (2006), Pension systems and intragenerational redistribu-
tion when labor supply is endogenous, Oxford Economic Papers, 58(3),
pp. 379-406.
[56] Stahlberg A.-C. (1990), Life cycle income redistribution of the public
sector: inter- and intra-generational e¤ects, in Generating Equality in
the Welfare State, Persson I. ed., Oslo:Norvegian University Press.
37
[57] United Nations (2009),World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision.
[58] Yaari M. (1965), Uncertain lifetime, life insurance, and the theory of the
consumer, Review of Economic Studies, 32(2), pp. 137-150.
[59] Zhang J. (1995), Social Security and Endogenous growth, Journal of
Public Economics, 58, pp. 185-213.
[60] Zhang J., Zhang J. and Lee R. (2001), Mortality decline and long-run
economic growth, Journal of Public Economics, 80, pp. 485-507.
[61] Zhang J., Zhang J. and Lee R. (2003), Rising longevity, education, sav-
ings, and growth, Journal of Development Economics, 70, pp. 83-101.
[62] Zhang J. and Zhang J. (2003), Long-run e¤ects of unfunded social secu-
rity with earnings-dependent benets, Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 28, pp. 617-641.
[63] Zhang J. and Zhang J. (2004), How does social security a¤ect economic
growth? Evidence from cross-country data, Journal of Population Eco-
nomics, 17, pp. 473-500.
38
Appendix A: proof of propositions
proposition 1
Assume an interior solution. Following (15), h = h ( = 1) h ( = 0) =

1+
t+1
(1 )Rt+1, where  = 1. It follows that
h

> 0 as long as t+1 > 0.
proposition 2
Assuming  = 1, actuarial fairness dened by (9) entails that:
tBh

t 1Zt 2wt 1 + tZt 1wt
 (1  ht 1)Bht 1Zt 2wt 1
=
tZt 2wt 1 + tZt 1wt
Zt 2wt 1
and then:
tBh

t 1wt 1 + t
 
qt 1Bht 1 + 1  qt 1

wt
 (1  ht 1)Bht 1wt 1
=
twt 1 + t
 
qt 1Bht 1 + 1  qt 1

wt
wt 1
Introducing (25) entails then that:
h



qt (1  ht)Bht + 1  qt
  tiBht 1 + t  qt 1Bht 1 + 1  qt 1
(1  ht 1)Bht 1
=




qt (1  ht)Bht + 1  qt
  t+ t  qt 1Bht 1 + 1  qt 1
Actuarial fairness with  = 1 is then obtained if:
t =
Bh1+t 1
Bht 1   1


qt (1  ht)Bht + 1  qt
qt 1 (1  ht 1)Bht 1 + 1  qt 1
proposition 3
Following equation (28), if  = 0, h = h0 = 
1+
. Accordingly, following
equation (28), q = Q (h0; ). Therefore, as g = q
 
Bh   1, dg
d
= 0 if  = 0.
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proposition 4
From eq. (31) we derive d (1 + g) =
 
Bh   1 dq+qBh 1dh. Knowing
that dq = @Q
@h
dh everything else being equal, it follows that d(1+g)
d
= 0 is equiv-
alent to
 
Bh   1 @Q
@h
+ qBh 1

dh
d
= 0 or to
 
Bh   1 "hQ +Bh dhd =
0.
From eq. (29), if  = 1 and  = e, we have @h
@
=

(1 h)Bh 1
Bh 1
(1+)(1 )
[(1+)+(1 )]2 
1+

1+
(1 )
(1+)+(1 )
Bh(Bh 1 )
(Bh 1)2
 >
0 8 > 0. It follows that d(1+g)
d
= 0 is equivalent to  "hQ = Bh

Bh 1 .
Thereafter, @Q
@h
= dG (:) (1 + )  Bh
+(1 h)Bh 1
(1 h)Bh = dG (:) (1 + )
   1
1 h +

h

.
In  = 0, it follows that "hQ =
@Q
@h
h
q
= 0 and then that  "hQ < Bh

Bh 1 .
On one hand we have:
d

Bh
Bh 1

dh
=  B
2h 1
(Bh 1)2
< 0.
On the other hand: d"hQ =

@2Q
@h2
h
q
+ @Q
@h
1
q
   @Q
@h
2 h
q2

dh 8d = 0, where
@2Q
@h2
= d2G (:) (1 + )2
   1
1 h +

h
2
+dG (:) (1 + )

  1
(1 h)2   h2

. As  1
1 h+

h
 0 8 h  h0 = 
1+
, assuming d2G (:)  0 8  0 results in  d"
h
Q
dh
 0.
Assuming d2G (:)  0 8  0,  "hQ > Bh

Bh 1 in  = 1 is then a necessary
and su¢ cient condition such as economic growth exhibits an inverse U-shaped
pattern with respect to the size of an actuarially fair retirement system whose
pensions are tied to the best or last years.
proposition 5
Following equation (29), if  = 0, h = h0 = 
1+
. Accordingly, fol-
lowing equation (28), q = Q (h0; ). Therefore, as g = q
 
Bh   1, dg
d
=
@Q
@
 
Bh0   1 if  = 0, where @Q
@
= dG (:)  ln

(1  h0)Bh0  0 and
@h
@
= 0.
proposition 6
Following equation (29), if  = 1 and  = ~, h = h0
h
1 + (1 )
(1+)+(1 )
(1 ht)Bht 1
Bht 1
i
.
It follows that @h
@
=

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  0. Following equa-
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tion (28), dq = dG (:)

 ln

(1  h)Bh d+ (1 + )    1
1 h +

h

dh
	
. It
follows that dq
d
 0 if dh
d
 
1+
ln[(1 h)Bh]
1
1 h  h
. If the latter condition holds,
as dg = dq
 
Bh   1+ qBh 1dh, dg
d
 0 everything else being equal.
proposition 7
Assuming that  "hQ > Bh

Bh 1 for  = 1,  @Q@h (h ( ; ) ; ) h(
;)
Q(h(;);) =
Bh(;)
Bh(;) 1 denes the contribution rate which maximizes economic growth.
It follows:
 
n
@2Q
@h2
h
@h
@
d  + @h
@
d
i
+ @
2Q
@@h
d
o
h
q
 @Q
@h
1
q
h
@h
@
d  + @h
@
d
i
+@Q
@h
h
@Q
@h [
@h
@
d+ @h
@
d]+ @Q@ d
q2
=  B
2h 1
(Bh 1)2
h
@h
@
d  + @h
@
d
i
()  

@2Q
@h2
h
q
+ @Q
@h
1
q
   @Q
@h
2 h
q2
+  B
2h 1
(Bh 1)2

@h
@
d 
=
h
@2Q
@h2
@h
@
+ @
2Q
@@h
i
h
q
+ @Q
@h
1
q
@h
@
  @Q
@h
h
@Q
@h
@h
@
+ @Q
@
q2
+  B
2h 1
(Bh 1)2
@h
@

d
As  

@2Q
@h2
h
q
+ @Q
@h
1
q
   @Q
@h
2 h
q2
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> 0 (see proof of proposition
4), it follows that:
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We have then @
2Q
@@h
= d2G (:)  ln

(1  h)Bh (1 + 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It follows that if "dG   1, @2Q@@h  0 8h  h0 = 1+ . As @Q@h  0
and @Q
@
 0, it follows from (32) that if @h
@
is su¢ ciently low, d

d
 0.
As @h
@
=

(1 h)Bh 1
Bh 1
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 , it is in particular the case if   is
su¢ ciently low.
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